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Introduction 
Conventional research on open innovation and collab-
oration examines how organizations open up the innov-
ation process and how they control the collaboration 
with others. The research also identifies the need for 
governance models and architecture of participation in 
collectives that embrace open innovation practices to 
help maintain momentum and ensure continuity. Exist-
ing research on systemic innovation and platform eco-
systems helps us understand the structure of 
platform-complement product systems (Boudreau and 
Hagiu, 2009: tinyurl.com/a3xc7xj; Baldwin and Woodard, 
2009: tinyurl.com/aceg9ac; Dahlander and Gann, 2010:
tinyurl.com/chacrs9). Studies examine the types of relation-
ships and information transactions among the mem-
bers of a platform ecosystem, the importance of 
platform owners as regulators of the ecosystem, and 
regulatory instruments available to them. 
Iyer (2006; tinyurl.com/csmescv) describes how software 
companies are operating in a small world of intercon-
nected networks and how innovation is increasingly 
taking place in such networks. The question is no 
longer whether or not to open the innovation process 
and collaborate, but how to best leverage a network of 
external parties (Tuomi, 2002: tinyurl.com/crbmhrv; Moore, 
2006: tinyurl.com/5rtbj6u; Pisano and Verganti, 2008: tinyurl
.com/67bcd3b; Vujovic and Ulhoi, 2008: tinyurl.com/b6l3jov). 
In most open source projects, there is a focal organiza-
tion that acts as that platform owner (or keystone in a 
project ecosystem) that provides the platform and facil-
itates contributions by other members in the com-
munity (Iansiti and Levien, 2004: tinyurl.com/7t4xgvn; 
Noori and Weiss, 2009; tinyurl.com/ae2n8su). A platform 
can be a product, service, or technology that provides a 
foundation for other parties to develop complementary 
products. The platform can be owned by a single play-
er, as in the case of Apple's control over the iPod and 
iPhone application ecosystems, or it can be developed 
and influenced by a group of players, as in the case of 
the Eclipse software development platform (des Rivi-
eres and Weigand, 2004: tinyurl.com/arwl3j3; Shuen, 2008: 
tinyurl.com/anvzq6y; Hagiu and Yoffie, 2009: tinyurl.com/
bu7zn3n).
The literature on how platform owners manage comple-
mentary markets is focused on complements that build 
on the platform but not on complements that integrate 
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with the platform, such as extensions. Platform exten-
sions extend the functionality of a platform beyond its 
core capabilities and can integrate at different levels 
with the platform and other existing extensions, and 
this integration reflects upon the integrity of the plat-
form. So, the quality of platform extensions contributed 
by community members has become a concern for plat-
form owners because it can comprise the overall quality 
of the platform and other complements as well (Messer-
schmitt and Szyperski, 2003: tinyurl.com/d2ulug3; Gawer 
and Cusumano, 2008: tinyurl.com/bjkhq3j; Bosch, 2009: 
tinyurl.com/arrlwcz).
We studied six open source projects (Eclipse, Firefox, 
Apache HTTP, Spring, OpenOffice, and MySQL) to ex-
amine the strategies followed by the platform owners to 
manage contribution by external parties and to manage 
the quality of the complements developed by those 
parties. We limited the research to one type of comple-
ment, platform extensions, because of the direct effect 
of the quality of extensions on platform integrity as well 
as to keep the study to a manageable size. 
Research Method
Research on regulating the platform extension develop-
ment process is still in its early stages, therefore there is 
little known about strategies adopted by platform own-
ers to control the quality of extensions developed by ex-
ternal parties (Hagiu, 2009; tinyurl.com/adn8gb2). We used 
the case study research approach due to the novelty of 
the research area (Eisenhardt, 1989; tinyurl.com/7dfuc3z). 
In our research, we examined 12 open source platforms 
and related commercialized software platforms (if any) 
from the time period between 2000 and 2009. The unit 
of analysis was a software platform that provides the 
ability for external parties to extend its functionalities. 
An example of an extension we examined is the tabbed 
browser extension for Firefox, which affects the core 
functionality of the platform.
Eisenhardt (1989; tinyurl.com/7dfuc3z) recommends theor-
etical sampling when selecting cases for case study re-
search, which implies that cases may be chosen to 
replicate previous cases or extend emergent theory. Un-
fortunately, previous research did not provide a refer-
ence for selecting cases using theoretical sampling; 
therefore, data was collected in two initial waves of four 
cases each and, once preliminary results emerged, a 
third wave of four more cases was chosen using theoret-
ical sampling.
Governance Models 
Within the sample cases, we found three types of gov-
ernance models: tight-control, loose-control, and hy-
brid-control.  Each governance model consists of the 
following attributes: community structure, extension 
types, and governance structure and network openness. 
Each model was associated with non-trivial trade-offs in 
terms of governance, openness, quality, and flow of 
ideas. 
Furthermore, different levels of governance and open-
ness may be applied to different types of extensions. In-
ternal extensions, which are more widely used and 
usually deployed together with the platform core, are of-
ten more tightly controlled than external extensions, 
which are developed to meet more specialized needs. In 
the case of internal extensions, there is a significant im-
pact of low quality of those extensions on the platform 
and on each other; a reduced flow of new ideas is traded 
off against higher quality. As for the external extensions, 
it is more important to allow new ideas to develop than 
to monitor their quality. Yet, the distinction between in-
ternal and external extensions is not fixed; over its life, 
an extension may change its type.
The governance structure of a network can be either 
hierarchical, flat, or a hybrid between these extremes. In 
a hierarchical governance structure, the platform owner 
both defines problems and selects which solutions are 
adopted, whereas in a flat structure a community de-
cides on both problems and solutions. The case 
between those two extremes is a hybrid of hierarchical 
and flat structures: although the community decides on 
problems, the platform owner selects solutions. 
Openness of a platform network refers to the degree to 
which participation in the network is open. In an open 
network, any party (partners, customers, or even com-
petitors) can contribute to the platform.  Open source 
projects are examples of this type of network. In a 
closed network, the platform owner selects who can par-
ticipate based on the capabilities and resources re-
quired for the innovation (Pisano and Verganti, 2008; 
tinyurl.com/67bcd3b). 
Table 1 summarizes the governance models, their attrib-
utes, and their associated effects on the quality of exten-
sions and flow of ideas. Table 2 summarizes the 
advantages and disadvantages of each of the three gov-
ernance models with an emphasis on the quality of ex-
tensions and flow of ideas.  
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Table 1. Summary of governance models and associated extensions types, governance structure, and network openness
Table 2. Advantages and disadvantages of the three types of governance models
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Regulatory Instruments 
To support the governance models and enforce control 
over  the development process of the platform exten-
sions, the platform owners needed to use a number of 
regulatory instruments in conjunction with the gov-
ernance model. In our reseach, we found that regulatory 
instruments enabled platform owners to manage in-
formation transactions in the platform network, support 
the process of developing extensions, and control the 
quality of the product by providing the community with 
tools to develop, test, and integrate extensions, and to 
share the experience among the platform members. 
The regulatory instruments help platform owners to es-
tablish barriers of entry to the developer community 
such as pricing or the development process. Instru-
ments such as platform architecture and toolkits help 
to create technical boundaries between the platform 
and the developer community. 
Regulatory tools such as pricing and membership refer 
to a pricing schema set by the platform owner to charge 
third-party developers for gaining access rights to the 
platform, information, and service. Pricing and mem-
bership programs enable platform owners to filter the 
inflow of ideas as well as the quality in the network. Al-
though using the pricing instrument enables the plat-
form owner to control the flow of ideas, there is no 
guarantee of eliminating poor-quality contributions be-
cause it depends on the pricing structure and the plat-
form owner’s need to access external resource (Hagiu, 
2008; tinyurl.com/bymusad). 
Development toolkits are another form of regulatory 
tool. Toolkits are a combination of software infrastruc-
ture and development frameworks that reduce the time 
and effort required to develop, provision, and operate 
extensions; they also contribute to quality. For ex-
ample, to ensure the quality of extensions, the Mozilla 
project offers a toolkit consisting of several tools that in-
clude a testing framework to test the performance and 
quality of Firefox extensions. Also, the Eclipse platform 
provides a plug-in development environment, a com-
prehensive series of build and user-interface creation 
tools, and tools for API maintenance.  
Sandboxes are another type of regulatory tool in which 
extension developers are allowed to test their exten-
sions in the actual deployment environment. For ex-
ample, Firefox provides a sandbox review process on its 
Firefox add-on site, where extensions are available for 
trial and testing by the community. The sandbox review 
process enables the developers to test their extension 
before moving it to the general-availability phase.
Introducing a development process is also another regu-
latory tool used by platform owners to control the qual-
ity of developed extensions and filter the inflow of ideas 
into the platform ecosystem. An example of the develop-
ment process used as a regulatory instrument is the in-
cubation process, which is another method used by 
platform owners to control the quality of extensions de-
veloped by external parties. The incubation process en-
ables the platform owners to filter the flow of ideas in 
the internal-extensions community of contributors (Du-
enas et al., 2007; tinyurl.com/aytv5x7). For some platforms, 
such as Mozilla, the incubator is a working directory that 
is considered a testing ground for experimenting with 
new ideas and it is a workspace where lead developers or 
module owners work with inexperienced developers. 
Practical Implications 
The results of our research are relevant to managers of 
both open and closed source platforms, third-party de-
velopers creating platform extensions, and researchers 
in innovation management. The research provides col-
laboration models that help platform owners under-
stand the strategies adopted by other platform owners 
to manage the quality of platform extensions. 
The models are a combination of collaboration gov-
ernance structures and regulatory tools that helped plat-
form owners to leverage the innovation process in their 
ecosystems and provide guidelines for developing third-
party complements. The research also opens opportun-
ities for future research on creating models for how plat-
form owners can maximize user innovation in 
platforms, and how they can manage the platform-ex-
tension development process.  
Conclusion 
Open source is a living example of the viability and sus-
tainability of the open-innovation model. The process of 
going open and maintaining growth and success of the 
open source platform is not chaotic or a set of random ac-
tions. Throughout the years, the open source community 
has learned how to organize itself and provide collabora-
tion models and tools that fit within the free/libre open 
source software context. These communities needed 
such control mechanisms in place to ensure quality and 
maintain growth. Open source platforms had evolved 
from voluntarily initiatives to sustainable entities along-
side commercial equivalents inside the software industry. 
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